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ABSTRACT 
BAILED OUT WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM MY FRIENDS: 
SOCIAL SIMILARITY AND CURRENCY SWAPS DURING THE 2008 CRISIS 
MAY 2017 
TIMOTHY E. MARPLE, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Kevin L. Young 
One policy reaction of the Federal Reserve to the 2008 financial crisis was the extension of 
currency swap lines to foreign central banks; this constituted the global transfer of billions of US 
dollars of wealth and exhibited the role of the US as a global lender of last resorts. Some have 
attempted to explain the supply of these lines as a function of risk mitigation for domestic US 
banks with foreign holdings, but no one has yet investigated its social dynamics. In recognizing 
that the global demand for emergency liquidity was greater than the Federal Reserve’s supply, 
this paper investigates how the similarity of foreign central banks affected the selection of banks 
to receive liquidity extensions. I calculate similarity scores to the US Federal Reserve for foreign 
banks eligible for liquidity extensions during the crisis. These measure the textual similarity of 
foreign central bankers’ speeches to those of the Fed, the institutional design similarity to that of 
the Fed, and the similarity of foreign central banks’ governors’ educational and professional 
backgrounds to those of the 2008 Federal Open Markets Commission members. I find that the 
similarity of foreign central banks to the US offers a significantly stronger and statistically more 
robust answer to the question of what drove this decision process, and offer implications for 
regulatory mechanisms to ameliorate this tendency toward homophily.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
During the outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve became one of the 
most consequential institutions on the global stage. The central bank served a well-known role as 
lender of last resort for US banks, shoring up their liquidity with highly contentious lending 
programs to preclude broader domestic economic collapse. At the same time, a similar but lesser-
known program was executed; in a series of currency swap agreements which cumulatively 
totaled over $500 billion, the Fed provided foreign banks and central banks with liquidity 
necessary to meet their own dollar debt obligations, acting as a global lender of last resort as well 
(Broz, 2015).  It is difficult to overstate the magnitude of this policy decision; these swaps 
totaled more than the entire 2008 US defense spending proposal, the largest discretionary 
spending item in the US federal budget that year (2008 Public Budget Database). Importantly, 
these swaps were larger than some of the domestic bank loans which ignited mass public 
movements like Occupy Wall Street, and others (Broz, 2015).  
The anticlimactic response to these swap lines is nearly as striking in academic literature 
as it was on the domestic political stage. Only a handful of studies have taken up the issue of 
currency swap recipients as a centerpiece of their analyses, and in most cases these have been 
confined to the explanation of lending recipient anomalies (Aizenman and Pasricha, 2009), rather 
than the structural patterns of global liquidity distribution. The only author to address this 
question directly found a relationship between US banking exposure and likelihood of swap 
receipt, framing the process as the Fed accommodating elite banking interests (Broz, 2015). In 
this study, I offer an alternative theory rooted in the cognitive foundations of human decision-
making under uncertainty. I suggest that social similarity of foreign central bankers to the 
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members of the Federal Open Market Commission (FOMC), who held the decision-making 
power over which states were considered for and ultimately received swap lines, was the most 
consequential factor in this process.  
While these swap lines constitute a unique case of clandestine policy made under 
uncertainty, the theory proposed here is not isolated to monetary or financial phenomena alone. 
Many institutions of US government are afforded similar autonomy in making highly 
consequential decisions, ranging from the discretion of enforcement actions given to many US 
federal agencies, to the appointment of any number of delegated positions within the US 
government at large. The logic of this model serves to broaden the lens through which we 
understand the actions of autonomous institutions in government and the processes by which 
elites make consequential decisions within them. Social similarity as an explanatory model is not 
isolated to the field of political economy, but serves to offer depth and nuance in explaining the 
case of foreign swap line recipients during the 2008 crisis.  
This study introduces novelty in both data and methods for the investigation of the Fed’s 
choice of swap recipients during the crisis. I introduce a sampling strategy to identify 
counterfactual recipients using propensity score matching based on explicit decision criteria 
enunciated in the meeting minutes of the FOMC. I further offer methodological innovation in the 
empirical measurement of social similarity, including the employment of corpus comparison 
techniques to measure similarity of central bankers’ speeches, the use of global employment 
networks to measure social distance of central bankers from FOMC members, and factor analysis 
to identify unique dimensions of institutional similarity across central banks. I find that all three 
dimensions of similarity are significantly associated with the likelihood of receiving a swap line, 
and conclude with implications for global economic management during future financial crises.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
During the financial crisis of 2008, the Federal Open Market Commission held singular 
discretion over the distribution of over half a trillion dollars through the vehicle of emergency 
currency swap arrangements with foreign central banks (Broz, 2015). Despite the readily 
apparent rationale for its investigation, it has received very little attention in the IPE community. 
What little scholarship which has broken ground in this field has investigated other 
idiosyncrasies of this period, such as which emerging market economies were ushered into the 
community of US swap line partners (Aizenman and Pasricha, 2009), and the conditions that led 
the US to serve the role of ‘global lender of last resort’ in the first place (McDowell, 2012). 
These have provided important insight into the many dyadic relationships which emerged from 
the deep liquidity demands left by the crisis, as well as their qualitative changes, but fail to focus 
on one of the most critical dimensions of this phenomenon: the determinants of receiving 
liquidity from the US when a country needed it.  
The only study which takes direct aim at this question highlights the role of domestic 
financial banks’ foreign interests in the determination of swap recipients (Broz, 2015). Using 
measures of foreign economies’ exposure to US finance, Broz effectively demonstrates the role 
of domestic US banks’ future well-being in the FOMC’s decision of swap line recipients. This is 
backed with an analysis of those same banks’ contributions to Congressional representatives 
during their consideration of a bill which would render the Fed’s lending activities more 
transparent. This two-step demonstration constructs a convincing case for the primacy of 
domestic capital interests in the provision of emergency liquidity, with findings robust to a 
variety of other theoretically relevant economic indicators (Broz, 2015). The findings paint a 
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picture of international finance as solely responsive to the giants of its own industry, with 
regulators bending to the will of capital rather than the other way around. The logic is coldly 
computational, with sheer interest calculations taking the place of more nuanced decision 
processes centered around the individuals who make them.   
Despite the attractively intuitive logic of the model, we should not believe that this is the 
only, or even the most significant influence on elite decision-making. This logic relies on a series 
of strong assumptions about the decision-making processes of FOMC members, not the least of 
which is the primary criteria for adjudication. Through the inclusion of solely economic 
indicators, this model leaves no causal room for social parameters of decision-making. This is in 
apparent conflict with the very decision criteria set forth by the FOMC, which Broz cites, 
suggesting the choice of swap recipients in part by their pursuit of ‘prudent policy’ ("Minutes of 
the Federal Open Market Committee October 28-29”, 2008). A replication of Broz’ model shows 
that, while the exposure to US finance variable is robust to other economic indicators, its 
significance is lost alongside institutional and policy-based measures, such as central bank 
independence . This is not in conflict with Broz’ conclusions, which suggest that the interests of 
domestic finance were significant but not singular influences on the choice of swap recipients. 
This does suggest the need for analytical accommodation of a broader variety of potential causal 
influences, especially those which relate to more social dimensions. Such an approach has the 
potential not only to identify the competition between economic and social determinants, but also 
to investigate their interplay in this process.  
This logic is consistent with a broad literature on the social dimension of international 
financial governance. The role of homophily and social clustering processes in the actions of 
financial elites is well-documented in the field of international political economy. Within the US, 
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there is evidence to show that social distance from the SEC is significantly associated with the 
frequency of firms’ advocacy over proposed legislation (Young et al, 2017), and some have 
argued that this dynamic of private-regulatory backscratching constituted the kindling of the 
2008 crisis (Baker, 2010; Engelen et al, 2012). Such findings on the influence of social 
relationships on regulation have been demonstrated elsewhere internationally, as well, including 
in the UK (Grant, 1993) and in northeast Asia (Selmier, 2013). Clearly, social selection is a 
consequential feature of the domestic interactions between private and public agents, and holds 
strong implications for the decisions of financial regulatory elites across the world.  
This dynamic between private and regulatory, however, appears to hold within the 
regulatory world itself. There is ample evidence of ‘club-like’ behavior between and among 
regulators themselves, in the absence of such relationships with private bankers (Tsingou, 2014). 
To a certain degree this should be expected; a vast body of literature on the ‘revolving door’ in 
finance has thoroughly established the fuzziness or total absence of boundaries between the 
classes of private financial elites and their regulatory counterparts, both within the US (Johnson 
2009; Johnson and Kwak 2010; Tett 2009) and internationally (Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2009; 
Young and Pagliari 2015). Still, the prevalence of this dynamic between regulators on a global 
stage suggests that the institutional contexts in which they work largely fail to mitigate the role 
of social selection in the decisions of financial regulatory elites.  
These findings strongly suggest that an analysis of financial regulatory elites’ decisions in 
isolation of the social dimensions of those decisions is only a partial analysis, at best. Ignoring 
this dimension can not only warp the models we build to reflect reality, but can even attribute 
false causality to economic indicators as a result of the collinearity with a social confound. For 
example, it is quite likely that countries receiving a swap line may have also had strong US bank 
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presence, both as a result of that country’s similarity to the US along regulatory and social 
dimensions. This paper aims to build an integrated framework of the FOMC’s decision process 
in selecting swap line recipients during the financial crisis of 2008. Building on the existing work 
by Broz, I build measures of different, theoretically relevant dimensions of social similarity to 
the Fed to predict the likelihood of a state receiving a swap line during or after the crisis.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
A. Theory 
This study aims to build a theory of swap recipient selection premised in social similarity. 
Approaching this question from a different dimension than earlier approaches, I suggest that the 
cognitive foundations of human decision-making are the primary factors which should be 
considered in clandestine, high-stakes policy choices. As such, this study situates its claims 
deeply within psychological literature on the heuristics used by individuals to adjudicate 
decisions under circumstances of great uncertainty. These micro-foundations are generalized to 
the macro-level to clarify the logic by which we would expect FOMC members to select on 
criteria of social similarity. 
The theory put forth in this paper is premised in cognitive models of decision-making. 
The cornerstone of this theory is found in work by Tversky and Kahneman, which documents the 
various heuristics and mental shortcuts used by individuals to economize on cognitive processing 
when assessing probabilities of some event under uncertainty (1975). These authors review three 
key psychological heuristics to handle uncertainty, those of representativeness, availability, and 
anchoring and adjustment, and document the biases resulting from their use. The 
representativeness heuristic pertains to answering the probabilistic question, ‘How likely is it that 
object A belongs to class B?,’ where the availability bias pertains to assessing likelihoods of 
some event based on the ease with which that event is imagined by the assessor. Adjustment and 
anchoring, collectively, handle the Bayesian updating of likelihood estimates within decisions 
based on the presentation of new information. The theory developed here will deal primarily 
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with the heuristics of representativeness and availability, for their clear applications to the 
assessment of risk in issuing swap lines.  
These heuristics’ interplay is the proposed mechanism by which social similarity 
influenced currency swap assessments during the crisis. Availability is the first link in this chain, 
and the natural first question an individual would ask when confronted with a situation 
demanding mass global liquidity provision; “what would a central bank that most needs and 
would most effectively use a currency swap look like?” This demands the development of a 
prototype by the assessor, namely a model foreign central bank against which to compare the 
various candidates for swaps. In the absence of an internationally agreed-upon ‘gold standard’ 
for central banking procedures (and the likely departure of a model prototype from these 
standards if they existed), it is likely that this comparison would be made against the Federal 
Reserve’s own characteristics. Indeed, social psychology experiments have demonstrated the role 
and frequency of egocentric availability biases, especially in the context of group assessments 
and interaction recall (Ross and Sicoly, 1979). Individuals are frequently found to use their own 
characteristics as relative norms in the absence of comparative criteria (Dunning and Hayes, 
1996), as indicators of the prevalence of certain attributes in a population at large (Krueger and 
Clement, 1994), and even to define positive traits and abilities along dimensions where they 
excel (Dunning and Cohen, 1992). Broadly, this suggests that individuals making comparisons in 
cases of uncertainty will often use themselves as models.  
The second link in this explanatory chain involves the representativeness bias. In 
assessing various potential swap recipients, FOMC members would ask “how likely is it that this 
central bank needs and will effectively use a currency swap?” As a direct corollary of the first 
cognitive response, FOMC members implicitly ask themselves how distant any given central 
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bank is from the characteristics of its own institution which it finds relevant for the management 
of a currency swap. These two heuristics have well-established, and often overlapping sets of 
biases resulting from their use in estimating likelihoods: insensitivity to existing prior 
probabilities, over- or under-estimation of likelihoods based on the imaginative range of the 
assessor, and the illusion of high validity in final choice (Tversky and Kahneman, 1975). These 
biases all suggest that human decision-making under uncertainty, even that of financial policy 
elites, has socially-influenced error. In the context of FOMC members assessing the probability 
of a swap meeting its intended goal, these heuristics suggest a decision based on how closely a 
foreign central bank resembles a sound institution for financial regulation and stability, or more 
simply, the Federal Reserve.  
This theory serves two interrelated purposes. The first is the establishment of a socially 
influenced cognitive foundation for decision-making during crisis, which serves to account for 
error which would go missed by pure cost-benefit models. The second purpose is to demonstrate 
the confound posed by earlier findings regarding this question. We should not expect the role of 
social similarity in the assessment of institutional soundness to be limited to central bankers’ 
decisions. Rather, this phenomenon should more broadly explain minimally some variance in a 
broad variety of international economic interactions, especially those involving risk, like trade 
and financial investment. In this way, this theory serves to undermine the causal link identified 
between US bank exposure in foreign countries and the likelihood of their receiving a currency 
swap, simply by dint of explaining some of the variance in the exposure at all. Earlier 
explanations of currency swaps as a factor of US investments are correct, but in a limited way; 
social similarity of foreign banking systems and their administrators serves as an indicator of 
their trustworthiness in the context of a risky decision. In this logic, US bank exposure abroad is 
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a simultaneous consequence of the same phenomenon which should affect the likelihood of 
currency swap, thereby offering statistically significant results as a factor of their shared causal 
precedents. Below, I formalize this theory in the form of three hypotheses with falsifiable claims 
about the proposed relationship.    
B. Hypotheses 
This paper enunciates a theory of social similarity regarding the determinants of currency 
swap recipients during the 2008 crisis. Testing such a theory requires grounding, substantively, 
what constitutes social similarity. As discussed at length below, literature in the field of elite 
communities and global policy coordination suggests that three dimensions of social similarity 
are especially consequential: speeches, institutional frameworks, and professional backgrounds. 
As such, the three hypotheses to be tested are listed more explicitly below:  
H1: Similarity of foreign central bankers’ speeches to those of FOMC members is positively 
associated with likelihood for currency swap receipt.  
H2: Similarity of foreign central banks’ institutional framework to that of the Federal 
Reserve is positively associated with likelihood for currency swap receipt. 
H3: Proximity of foreign central bankers to members of the FOMC in a network of global 
employment is positively associated with likelihood for currency swap receipt. 
To test these claims, I employ a multiple logistic regression model predicting a currency 
swap with matched cases using variables relevant to each dimension of social similarity. This 
study does not test the role of social similarity in the volume of swap received, especially as this 
is a function of the mass of the receiving economy. Rather, these explanatory variables are used 
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to predict the binary receipt of a swap at all, which helps to understand their role in the broader 
likelihood of choice.  
The measures for these types of social similarity are all constructed as a function of 
existing data on the actions and characteristics of these institutions and their respective 
administrators. These variables are discussed at length in the section below, regarding their 
choice, source, measurement units, and interpretation, following the sampling process used to 
identify potential counterfactuals.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND CASES 
A. Matching Counterfactual Recipient States 
Not all countries received a currency swap line during the crisis, nor were all countries 
necessarily eligible for or in need of one. Indeed, it would serve to overestimate the 
competitiveness and underestimate the likelihood of swap receipt if its probability were assumed 
to be evenly distributed across all states in 2007 and 2008. In reality, only a select group of 
countries was considered for a swap line: those which were deemed by the FOMC to need one. 
For this reason, in testing a social theory of swap line decision-making, it is essential to establish 
a population of reasonable counterfactual cases against which to compare the actual swap 
recipients. A country could be similar to the US in every way, but if its economy was not 
meaningfully affected by the crisis it would be foolish to include them in this model. I render this 
logic more visually explicit in figure 1 below. Because representatives of the Federal Reserve 
informed me that a list of all states under consideration for these swaps is unequivocally 
unavailable, I use matching to generate a population of counterfactual states against which to 
compare swap recipients along social dimensions.  
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Figure 1: Case Selection Logic 
 
The project makes use World Bank macroeconomic data and data from Daniel 
McDowell’s work on bilateral central bank swap line development to match countries on the 
explicit decision criteria enunciated by the Federal Open Market Commission members, namely 
the mass of the economy, depth of the crisis domestically, and the availability of alternative 
liquidity lines (“Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee”, 2008). The proxy variables 
used to measure these decision criteria for matching are listed below in table 1: 
Table 1: Variables for Matching 
Decision Criterion Data Used for Matching 
Size of economy GDP                                                      [World Bank, 2016] 
 
 
Depth of crisis 
Change in GDP 
Bank liquidity to reserve ratio 
Real interest rate                                     [World Bank, 2016] 
Domestic credit to private sector 
Domestic credit provided by financial sector 
Availability of alternative lines 2007/8 network of swap lines                 [McDowell, 2016] 
 
The matching process involved several important decisions in the data preparation. 
Because missing values needed to be imputed for matching, I chose no variables which were 
missing more than 50% of their values for all states in 2007. Furthermore, not all actors who 
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received swap lines were comparable in scale; most were single central banks, but one was the 
European Central Bank, which has constituent member central banks. This was the only 
‘umbrella’ central bank to receive a line, so I chose to include the state-level data of all 
constituent members rather than the aggregate data for the Eurozone. Finally, there were 2 states 
(Brazil and South Korea) which received multiple lines, one of which came from the US in each 
case. Because all other states which received alternative lines did not receive one from the US, 
and because these two states received alternate lines from distinct countries (China and 
Argentina), I decided it was viable to include them in the analysis. These decisions left 30 
individual states receiving lines, 16 of which were ECB members and 14 of which received their 
swap lines independently. These were coded to be distinguished during the analysis.  
I used these data in a propensity score matching algorithm with the ‘MatchIt’ package in 
R. This method seeks pairs of states with the lowest dyadic difference in matched propensity 
scores from a specified regression model (Ho et al, 2011). In this case, I used a logit model with 
the earlier variables after imputing their missing values with the ‘Mice’ package, involving an 
estimation of missing variable observations based on values observed in similar units (van 
Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011). I included binary indicators for each variable, which 
were coded 1 if an observation was missing that variable’s data before imputation. This logit 
model had good fit, with a Hoslem test p-value of 0.695. As there are a variety of choices 
available for the method of matching with this package, I chose ‘optimal’ because of its ability to 
handle instances with few control cases for each treatment case (in this case, there was a ratio of 
about 1:4 respectively) (Ho et al, 2011).  
Finally, I had to choose a ratio, or the number of matches per treatment state. This had a 
strict upper bound of 4. I did this by iteratively generating matches for all ratio values of 1:4, and 
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testing the statistical significance of the difference in the populations’ propensity scores in the 
same model, the results of which are shown in table 2. Given the results, I chose to have 2 
matches for each treatment state. This is because it is the highest value with an average matched 
propensity score above 0.3, and because of the significance of the difference between the two 
scores. Finally, this was chosen in part for both the convenience and reasonableness of the 
counterfactual population size. Figure 2 displays the distribution of propensity scores with the 
ratio of 2 across units.  
Table 2: Case Matching Propensity Score Comparisons 
 
The results yielded 90 countries, 30 of which received currency swap lines and 60 of 
which were similar in the dimensions stated by the Federal Reserve as relevant. These 60 
matched countries serve as the counterfactual recipient states in this project, and are those which 
I will include in my models to test the stated hypotheses about social similarity.  
 
 
 
 
 
Match 
Count
P-Value of Difference in Matched 
& Unmatched Propensity Scores
Average Propensity Score 
of Treated & Matched
Average Propensity 
Score of Unmatched
Ratio of Unmatched to 
Matched & Treated Means
0 > 0.000 0.656 0.066 0.101
1 > 0.000 0.496 0.002 0.004
2 > 0.000 0.333 > 0.000 0.001
3 > 0.000 0.250 > 0.000 0.001
4 > 0.000 0.200 > 0.000 > 0.000
16 
Figure 2: Case Matching Propensity Score Distribution 
 
B. Governors’ Speeches 
The choice of speech similarity is grounded in work by international political economists 
who focus on the relationships between central bankers, and between the Federal Reserve and 
other central banks specifically. Work on central bank communications has shown the significant 
consequences they have for financial markets (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2005; Hüning, 2016) 
and that strategies of central bankers’ speeches have different outcomes in the development of 
policy both domestically and internationally (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007; Amaya and Filbien, 
2015). The semantic influence of central bankers’ speeches on global markets demonstrates its 
unique power within international political economy, rendering it an intuitive potential 
explanatory variable. 
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Alongside the economic effects, linguistic anthropology has shown that similarity in 
speech constitutes a community among its members, in which social norms and mores are 
developed and respected (Gumperz and Levinson, 1996). As shown above, global policy regimes 
are both reflected and actualized through patterns of rhetorical similarity across central bankers 
and other relevant actors. Surprisingly, nearly all studies measuring central bankers’ speeches 
and their similarity operationalize these values only as dependent variables, and rarely consider 
them as theoretically relevant predictors of social phenomena. This study does the opposite, 
using semantic similarity as an indicator of social similarity hypothesized to have influenced the 
currency swap selection process.  
A necessary first step in measuring rhetorical similarity is the identification of the 
population of relevant speech-material. The Bank for International Settlements hosts a repository 
of foreign central bankers’ speeches, which is publicly available on their website. After 
contacting the BIS about the criteria for publishing speeches, a representative responded with the 
following: 
“The central bankers’ speeches can either be brought to the attention of the BIS by the 
different central banks, or collected by BIS staff from the central banks’ websites. In the 
latter case, BIS staff use a tool which was developed in-house to scan the different central 
banks website. Unfortunately, the tool is not 100% reliable, so it is possible that some 
speeches are missed, but we do not have an estimate of the number of missing speeches.   
Also, the BIS only publishes speeches that are already made available by the central 
banks in English, which implies that (i) some speeches might not be published on the BIS 
website because they are not available in English, and (ii) any translation is provided by 
the central banks.  
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Furthermore, we apply some other criteria when selecting speeches. These are that:  
• the subject of the speech is of interest to the international central banking 
community. For example, if it's a very domestically-oriented speech that would 
only mean something to citizens of one particular country, we would not take it; 
• the speech has been given by a senior central banker; 
• it has been given recently; ideally within the last two weeks.” (Canelli, 2016)  
While the missingness of some speeches can be seen as an inhibiting factor, the selection 
criteria of the BIS can be used as analytical leverage in this project in a few ways. First, the 
delimitation of subject importance in speeches is relevant to the kinds of speeches which the 
Federal Reserve would both review and deem consequential. The information acquisition 
resources of the Federal Reserve, while immense, are not infinite, and only substantively relevant 
speech material is likely to be relevant for their assessments of rhetorical similarity. Furthermore, 
the delimitation to English or English-translated speeches is also conducive to the social 
similarity dimension used in this paper, namely through the provision of an additional step in the 
data-generating process wherein central banks have the ability to more carefully and accurately 
emulate the rhetorical patterns of the FOMC.    
In systematically measuring the semantic similarity of these speeches, I chose to use the 
‘textreuse’ package in R for its flexibility and ability to handle large corpora. I chose two 
extremes of its many options for corpus similarity. One is a proportion of shared terms used in a 
corpus after it’s been cleaned of common terms (Mullen, 2015). This serves as a blunt instrument 
of rhetorical similarity in a simple proportion of shared meaningful terms when central bankers 
give speeches. The other is the Smith-Waterman algorithm, which generates dyadic scores 
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between corpora (speeches) based on their sharing complex strings of terms (Mullen, 2015). This 
has been used to measure the degree of bill recycling across US state legislatures (Linder et al, 
2016), and in this context serves to capture a more nuanced aspect of rhetorical similarity. These 
two measures capture very different aspects of speech similarity, and allow me to measure both 
the simple semantic similarity of any central bankers’ speech to those of the FOMC, but also to 
test for instances of mimicry which could signal adherence to the US’ financial regulatory 
regime. 
For the simple similarity measure, I calculated the proportion of shared terms across all 
speeches for each country with the US, for each year between the earliest available and 2008. 
Importantly, this involved the inclusion of all speeches within a year, rather than the calculation 
of a score for each pair of speeches. This measure, bound between 0 and 100, reflects the simple 
similarity of vocabulary employed by central bankers in their descriptions of modern economic 
issues and their proposed resolutions. Specifically, it is the maximum similarity score between a 
state and the US in any of the five years preceding the crisis. Across the dataset of swap 
recipients and matched counterfactuals, the average score was 23.48 with a standard deviation of 
26.81. 
The Smith-Waterman algorithm required a more complex series of measurement 
decisions, especially because of the sensitivity of the output score to the parameters used to 
estimate it. Specifically, the algorithm identifies the optimal string match between documents 
based on the frequency of matching, mismatching, and missing terms between the two 
documents, which are weighted by scalar values provided by the researcher. In the absence of a 
methodologically or theoretically informed norm for this process (Linder et al, 2016), I opted to 
estimate scores for each speech dyad across a variety of parameters. Because the text processing 
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eliminates common English terms, I weigh the penalty imposed on gaps and mismatches in a 
given string equally, and thereby ‘tune’ the algorithm by changing the magnitude of the match 
reward relative to these, fixed at 1.  
For each year in which there was speech data for a country, every possible pair of its 
speeches with those of the US in the same year were compared with this algorithm, cycling 
between match reward values of 1 and 5. These scores, after being averaged across all document 
dyads within each year, were transformed from their raw values to their proportion of the 
maximum possible score (which would be perfect speech identicality). The final measure used in 
the regression models reflects the maximum score proportion for all states in the five years 
preceding the crisis. Bound between 0 and 1, the mean value of this variable across observations 
was 0.002, with a standard deviation of 0.003. 
C. Governors’ Backgrounds 
The importance of shared professional backgrounds among financial elites is a long-
standing social scientific finding, and is especially central in literature on the revolving door and 
regulatory capture. Measured in a broad variety of ways, shared backgrounds of elites has been 
associated with collusion between elites, both within and between regulatory bodies, and 
between the public and private sectors (Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2009; Baker, 2010; Young, 
2012; Selmier, 2013). Recent work has extended this logic to a relational framework with the 
logic of social network analysis, such as Young et al’s findings on the relationship between 
firms’ network distance to regulators and the frequency of their advocacy (2017). I apply this 
logic to central bankers’ relationships to understand its role in swap line agreements. I argue that 
the similarity of professional and educational backgrounds of foreign central bank members to 
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those of the Federal Open Market Commission members is consequential for the likelihood of 
that individual’s central bank to receive a swap line.  
To measure this, I make use of the BoardEx dataset, which is an atlas of global 
employment history of individuals, including educational backgrounds and other professional 
activities. This dataset includes both public and private organizations, which includes central 
banks of various countries. The data include both the employment history of individuals, as well 
as the years in which that employment was active, allowing for the construction of a firm-to-firm 
social network, with weights proportional to the magnitude of shared employee-years. I follow 
the approach employed by Young, Marple and Heilman, whereby these data are used to construct 
a network of inter-firm connections (2017). This first involved the construction of a bimodal 
network of connections between individuals and organizations, which was subsequently 
‘collapsed’ on individuals to constitute ties between organizations premised on their shared 
individuals. Figure 3 shows this network for all connections between organizations in the sub-
network containing central banks for the 5 years preceding the crisis, with red nodes indicating 
collapsed Fed branches, green nodes indicating other central banks, and blue nodes indicating all 
other organizations.  
This dataset has two important caveats worth acknowledging. First, there is clear regional 
bias of employment history focused strongly on Western states. Much like the missingness of 
speeches, this can be considered as an advantage. Western states conduct the overwhelming 
majority of financial business (Porter and Williams, 2016), meaning that one should expect the 
regional bias to be in part due to the uneven distribution of banking density. Furthermore, 
because the final regression models omit all states in the ECB and other regional central banks 
for their qualitatively different natures (Broz, 2015), their missing scores are moot. Finally, two 
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swap recipients were also missing from the dataset, adding an extra empirical hurdle to statistical 
support for this hypothesis with these data.  
The second caveat is significantly more severe, but has an established solution. Big data 
are rife with errors, and BoardEx is no exception. There are many instances of artificially distinct 
firms in these data, such as the appearance of McDonald’s, McDonald’s Restaurants, and 
McDonald’s Inc. While anyone could logically conclude that these are the same firm, computers 
do not have this common sense. This problem is not apparent in instances of central banks, but 
duplicity of actually singular firms could exaggerate the distance between one central bank and 
another in the broader network. To handle this, I apply the entity resolution algorithms outlined 
by Marple et al, which broadly manipulate the nature of connections between firms to reduce the 
instances of artificially distinctions (forthcoming). These techniques have demonstrable effects 
on the network, especially the topological measures involving distances between firms, which 
improve the reliability of any firm-to-firm distance calculation significantly (Marple et al, 
forthcoming).  
Figure 3: Network of Central Bank Connections by Background 
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After applying these resolution techniques, I further replicated Young et al’s approach 
through the log-transformation of edge weights, forcing the distance algorithm to choose paths 
with the largest number of shared employees, and simultaneously handling the power-law 
distribution of edge weights in a more linear fashion (2017). This allowed for a neater calculation 
of distances between any two organizations in the network, offering scores for all cases’ central 
banks which were in the dataset, and a score of infinity for those banks which were not. Finally, I 
calculate proximity as a function of distance, specifically by subtracting the normalized distance 
scores from 1. To account for firms not included in the network, I again use Young et al’s 
strategy, whereby their distance is considered to be the highest integer not included in the 
distribution of distances for observed firms (Young et al, 2017).  
This yielded a score for all countries’ central banks which ranged from 0 to 1, with 1 
reserved solely for the Federal Reserve itself (perfect proximity) and 0 for central banks which 
were not in the dataset (maximal distance). The final score included in the regression models is 
the maximum proximity of each central bank to any of the Federal Reserve branches in the five 
years preceding the crisis, allowing only for the influence of fresh relationships which should not 
be expected to have deteriorated significantly by 2008 . The average proximity score in this 
distribution for all case states is 0.437, with a standard deviation of 0.379.    
D. Institutional Framework 
During their deliberations, the Federal Reserve alluded to the importance of central 
banks’ pursuit of ‘prudent policies’ in deciding whether they should receive a line (“Minutes of 
the Federal Open Market Committee”, 2008). While policy prudence is in part a factor of the 
individuals who make them, the agenda of feasible policies is set by the allowances of 
institutional arrangements among individual central banks. For example, work on institutional 
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design of central banks shows that the legal institutional arrangements of a bank affect anything 
from its stability and success (Barth et al, 2001) to its unique policies, like inflation targeting 
(Dittmar et al, 1999) and crisis management (Davies and Green, 2010). For this reason, we 
should expect policy maneuvering by foreign central bankers to be significantly affected by the 
context in which they work, and subsequently that the Federal Reserve would strongly weigh the 
variation on this dimension. This notion is corroborated by the independent insignificance of US 
bank exposure in Broz’s regression models when central bank independence scores are included.  
I measure institutional similarity using the World Bank banking regulation and 
supervision survey (Cihak et al, 2012). This survey includes a broad battery of questions on 
banking regulation within an economy, ranging from the rules governing entry into banking, to 
the enforcement quality of various banking regulations. One section is of particular importance 
for this study, namely the questions on the survey relating to supervision of the banking sector. 
This includes questions such as what kind of entity supervises banks, the count thereof, their 
responsiveness to the executive, legislature, and their liability for damages to banks incurred by 
regulation, among others. In total, 18 relevant binary indicators were chosen from the 41 possible 
responses in this section, either through the reduction of mutually exclusive responses or the 
omission of questions for which the US offered no response . The responses to these questions 
were recoded from text to binary indicators; 1 for yes, -1 for no, and 0 for a non-response. The 
survey includes 173 countries, and of the 90 treated and matched case states, 30 were not 
included in the survey and had 0 values for all questions. 
These binary indicators had clearly identifiable subjects, each with a different number of 
responses. To account for the absolute correlations between these responses, which ranged from 
0.00 to 0.84, they were reduced using factor analysis. Exploratory principal component analysis 
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revealed that 5 factors were both statistically sufficient (final principal component with SD > 1) 
and qualitatively logical, which was confirmed with the loadings for the 5-factor model (Tucker-
Lewis factoring reliability = 0.813). Tables 3 and 4 below displays the factor correlation matrix 
and loadings. 
Table 3: Factor Loading Correlation Matrix 
 
Table 4: Factor Loadings 
 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
Factor 1 1.00 -0.25 -0.11 -0.19 0.22
Factor 2 -0.25 1.00 0.08 0.19 -0.07
Factor 3 -0.11 0.08 1.00 -0.02 0.23
Factor 4 -0.19 0.19 -0.02 1.00 -0.15
Factor 5 0.22 -0.07 0.23 -0.15 1.00
Binary Indicator Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
Simple Majority Legislat. Appoints Head 1.006
Simple Majority Legislat. Removes Head 0.810
Supervisor Responsible to Legislature 0.460
Adopted Basel Standards 0.597
Mandatory Infraction Reporting 0.536
Multiple Superintendents Supervising -0.489
Cabinet Removes Head -0.567
Super-Majority Legislat. Removes Head -0.608
Prime Minister Removes Head 0.904
Prime Minister Appoints Head 0.880
Mandatory Infraction Repercussions 0.569
Head Has Power to Forgive Infractions 0.464
Central Bank Supervises Banks 0.392
Head Has Fixed Term 0.343
Multiple Finance Supervisor -0.465
Single Finance Supervisor -0.621
Responsible for Good-Faith Mistakes 0.679
Responsible for Damages 0.618
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  The reduction of these questions to factors allowed for two final manipulations, both of 
which are included in the final regression model. The first is the most straight-forward use of 
factor scores, namely the creation of an index through simple summation of their values. After 
the summation of the factor scores, the final scores were normalized by the US’ score on the 
factor index and subtracted from 1. In this way, they represent the relative variance of the factor 
index score for any country’s central bank, including those which had no responses, from the 
responses of the Fed. Across all cases, the mean was 4.097 with a standard deviation of 2.126, 
ranging from 0 to 9.886. 
The second manipulation makes use of cosine similarity, which involves calculating the 
angle between the multidimensional vectors constituted by these scores. This represents an 
importantly different understanding of these scores from the simple summation index, namely 
through the gradated measurement of parallel or orthogonal responses in the 5-dimensional space 
constituted by these scores. While the factor sum accounts solely for the varying weights of the 
responses to these questions as assigned by factor analysis, cosine similarity accounts for both 
the directionality and magnitude of these score vectors as they differ from the Fed’s. This score 
is bound between -1 and 1, with 0 representing perfect identicality, and -1 and 1 representing 
different poles of perfect orthogonality. The mean score across all cases was -0.497, with a 
standard deviation of 0.339 .  
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
To test these hypotheses, I constructed a linear model predicting a currency swap from 
the Federal Reserve with a battery of variables relevant to each claim, and a final model 
including them all. The models presented in table 5 include only the significant variables after 
various exploratory models which demonstrated their robustness alongside such measures as 
capital account openness and GDP growth rate. These models are only run for non-ECB states 
which were not members of broader regional central banks, which were 48 of the 90 cases states. 
This reduction added a second level of filtering to establish an appropriate population of 
potential recipients, amongst whom this relationship is meant to be tested . The probit regression 
results offer support for the first and third hypotheses, and indirect support for the second. Table 
5 displays the significance of each variable set, first by hypothesis and finally together with 
pseudo-R2 figures for comparison with Broz’s model. Figure 4 shows marginal effects with 95% 
confidence intervals, also reported in the results.  
A first note is that only one variable defies expectations. Term similarity holds a negative 
independent effect on the likelihood of swap receipt, despite contrary predictions. This measure 
is specifically the average proportion of total terms shared across all speeches in the five years 
preceding the crisis, ranging from 0 to 100 for interpretation. A separate regression shows that 
term similarity is positively associated with swap likelihood on its own, which suggests its 
negative direction is a result of its interaction with the Smith-Waterman scores. This has some 
logic to it; higher proportion of shared terms without an increase in the length of shared string 
content should represent misalignment on substantive policy areas with the US, thereby 
diminishing the likelihood of a swap. Outside of this variable, all others demonstrate a positive 
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relationship between social similarity to the Federal Reserve and the likelihood of receiving a 
currency swap.  
The single strongest predictor of swap receipt is a foreign central bank’s independence, 
using the CBI dataset (Garriga, 2016). This variable, measured as the proportional difference 
from the US’ score in 2007, is robust to all other measures included for the various hypotheses 
and controls. This variable ranges from -0.4 to 0.4, meaning that the country with the highest 
CBI score had between 1.28 and 2.82 times greater likelihood of receiving a swap line from the 
US than the country with the lowest score. This offers important support for the notion that the 
US strongly preferred independent central banks to manage the currency swaps it was issuing. 
This inclination toward independent central banks is a strong first indicator of the Fed’s 
preference for social similarity, comporting with its long history of operating largely 
independently of Congress.  Despite the dearth of significance for either of the institutional 
factor measures, their negative direction alongside the positive effect of CBI scores can be 
interpreted as partial support for the second hypothesis .  
The next strongest predictor of a currency swap during this period was the similarity of 
foreign central bankers’ speeches. As discussed, the negative term similarity is understandable as 
an independent effect alongside the strong, positive effect of Smith-Waterman similarity. This 
finding is robust to the inclusion of a variety of other economic indicators, including GDP 
growth, and is largely independent of the BoardEx network proximity (correlation = 0.31). This 
variable’s range is bound from 0 to 1 , so these results show that a 0.01% increase in similarity 
score with the US, as a proportion of the maximum possible score, is independently associated 
with a 1.18 to 2.45 times greater likelihood of receiving a swap line. This offers strong support 
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for the first hypothesis, and demonstrates nuance in the kinds of speech signaling rewarded by 
the Fed. 
Finally, the proximity of foreign central bankers to members of the FOMC is strongly 
and positively associated with the likelihood of a currency swap. This variable is again bound 
between 0 and 1, with the score of 0 reserved for states not in the employment network, and the 
score of 1 only available to the Federal Reserve itself. By this logic, the central bank closest to 
the Fed in this network had between 1.04 and 1.91 times higher likelihood of receiving a 
currency swap line than the farthest bank in the network, independent of all other factors. 
Despite the relatively marginal substantive effects at the lower bound of this confidence interval, 
this finding is both robust to a host of other economic factors, and strongly supportive of the 
third hypothesis. These results suggest that well-connected central bankers were far better-
equipped to solicit a currency swap during the crisis than central bankers who had little 
professional overlap with FOMC members. 
Collectively, these results demonstrate strong support for the broader theory articulated 
here, namely that dimensions of social similarity played a significant role in the selection of 
recipients for currency swaps during the 2008 crisis. These results show stronger promise than 
those relying solely on economic indicators, with pseudo-R2 values up to twice those of earlier 
predictive models. The final model includes a greater number of states with stronger theoretical 
justification for their inclusion, and its findings are robust to the inclusion of the primary 
explanatory variables of earlier studies . The model validates claims made by the FOMC that 
states with greater economic mass were more strongly considered, a corroboration of Broz’s 
earlier findings. With every ten-fold increase in GDP, a country is estimated to be 1.006 and 
1.119 times likelier to have received a currency swap from the Federal Reserve. Its continued 
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robustness across models is interesting when juxtaposed against its subordinate significance to 
that of speech similarity and CBI, lending further credence to the claim that social similarity 
played a comparable or stronger role in this decision process than economic indicators alone.  
Table 5: Regression Results 
 
 Dependent variable: Currency Swap 
  
 Speeches Institutional Backgrounds All 
 
5yr Max. Term Similarity -0.003   -0.004* 
 (0.002)   (0.002) 
     
5yr Max. S.W. Similarity 0.503**   0.533*** 
 (0.188)   (0.186) 
Factor Cosine Similarity  -0.078  -0.145 
  (0.190)  (0.174) 
Factor Index Sum  -0.019  -0.017 
  (0.027)  (0.024) 
     
5yr Max. Proximity   0.319* 0.340** 
   (0.163) (0.156) 
     
'07 CBI Weighted Diff. 0.597*** 0.590*** 0.666*** 0.642*** 
 (0.202) (0.217) (0.205) (0.202) 
     
Log GDP 0.100*** 0.119*** 0.082*** 0.059** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.027) (0.027) 
Constant -2.332*** -2.717*** -1.998*** -1.485** 
 (0.485) (0.486) (0.603) (0.603) 
 
Observations 48 48 48 48 
Max. Likelihood Pseudo-R2 0.653 0.600 0.628 0.695 
Log Likelihood -6.953 -10.359 -8.625 -3.842 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 23.907 30.718 25.250 23.685 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Figure 4: Marginal Effects on Log-Odds of Currency Swap Receipt 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
These results offer strong support for the theory proposed here, that social similarity held 
a significant influence on the likelihood of a state to receive a swap. Among the states which 
would be reasonably considered for a swap, delimited through matching on explicit selection 
criteria and filtering qualitatively illogical cases, the similarity of speeches, professional 
backgrounds, and institutional factors all held significant effects on swap likelihood in the 
expected direction. While the measure constructed for institutional similarity held no significant 
effects, the coefficients were in the expected direction, and another measure of institutional 
similarity to the US proved to be the strongest indicator of swap receipt. Furthermore, these 
variables were robust to a host of traditional economic indicators such as GDP (net and growth 
rate), and US trade share and bank exposure, which have been used to explain this phenomenon. 
The regression models presented suggest that social similarity strongly affected a central bank’s 
chances at receiving a currency swap during the financial crisis, and that it holds superior 
explanatory power to sheer economic indicators alone.  
Another finding of interest is crucial for supporting an earlier claim made about this 
theory, namely that US bank exposure and trade may be simultaneous byproducts of the same 
influence as that affecting swap receipt. On top of the insignificance of US bank exposure and 
trade share alongside the measures for social similarity constructed here in predicting swap 
receipt, two basic OLS models show that both of these variables are strongly and positively 
associated with measures of social similarity.  These results even vary logically, with 
professional backgrounds of central bankers exhibiting stronger influence on bank exposure, and 
speech similarity and CBI affecting trade more strongly. Taken together, these results offer 
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strong support for the claim that social similarity drives estimates of foreign institutions’ 
trustworthiness, thereby simultaneously affecting both decisions such as trade and investment, as 
well as elite decisions like emergency currency swaps. Social similarity may come to be shown 
as a confound to a broader variety of international economic predictive models, and future work 
should take its role more seriously under such circumstances.  
There are several political consequences of these findings. First, cognitive models of 
decision-making under uncertainty apply even to the loftiest political and economic elites, and 
theories which attempt to explain their behavior on the international stage should consider social 
psychological foundations more strongly. As a corollary, we should not expect this to be an 
isolated circumstance of socially homophilous tendencies, rather an expression of basic human 
tendencies, the amplitude of which is proportional to situational uncertainty. The selection of 
currency swap recipients offers a unique window into the decision-making by the Fed under 
circumstances which allow minimal time for the preparation of thorough dossiers which typically 
accompany the redistribution of billions of dollars. In lieu of more informed cost-benefit 
analyses, members of the FOMC appear to have relied on basic social heuristics in identifying 
qualified recipients, a factor of the uncertainty they faced. Absent an institutionalized mechanism 
to handle this, we should expect it with the next crisis.  
Economically, these results appear to have graver consequences. If this behavior is 
indicative of broader trends in the distributive decisions of global financial policy elites, then a 
continued insulation of wealth from the global south should be expected. Even if this behavior is 
isolated to crises of the sort which occurred in 2008, this trend suggests that the distribution of 
much-needed resources during a global banking epidemic could spell the doom of nations who 
don’t quite look like the hardly-diverse Federal Reserve (Klein, 2016). These tendencies impede 
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progress toward a more equitably distributive global economy, and therefore demand some 
institutionalized mitigation system to preclude unnecessary suffering which would result in those 
dissimilar states.  
Such a mechanism would require some enforcement over the Federal Reserve, which is 
domestically unlikely but could be pursued through proposals in negotiations like the Basel 
Accords. An example of such a mechanism could resemble a phone tree for emergencies, 
organized hierarchically by connectedness of central banks via existing swap lines. Such a 
mechanism would make use of the relational nature of existing dyadic central bank support lines, 
which have flourished after the crisis (McDowell, 2016), to ensure the most efficient allocation 
of emergency currency for debt repayment during a global crisis. This follows the existing stated 
logic of the Fed in their avoidance of states with existing lines, but extends that framework to a 
system-level analysis of distances between states that both have and need resources of viable 
currency. Absent such a mechanism on the international stage, especially one to which multiple 
powerful central banks adhere, we should expect recurrences of these homophilous tendencies 
during highly uncertain and consequential distributive situations. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
Friends of the Fed managed to survive the 2008 financial crisis via their preferential 
receipt of much-needed currency swaps to pay dollar debt obligations. This paper has 
demonstrated that social similarity of central banks along the dimensions of speeches, 
professional backgrounds, and institutional contexts were all consequential for a state’s 
likelihood of receiving such a swap. These theoretically informed predictors were built from 
relevant datasets of central bankers’ speeches, professional and educational histories, and binary 
indicators of relevant central bank institutional characteristics. These variables have greater 
significance in predicting swap receipt likelihood than economic indicators from earlier models, 
such as bank exposure and trade share with the US, and have even been shown to predict those 
economic indicators as simultaneous byproducts.  
This paper has opened the door to the rigorous quantification of social similarity in the 
context of predicting international political economic phenomena, such as swap line receipt 
during a crisis. Future work should address some of the inadequacies of the measures generated 
here, which were necessary consequences of an exploratory study like this. Specifically, future 
studies should disaggregate the nuance of textual signaling within speech in more detailed ways, 
such as the employment of relational text analysis to elucidate central banking ideologies (Rolfe 
et al, forthcoming). This approach would more closely access the aspect of speech similarity 
which this study showed to be consequential, namely the particular constellations of policy-
relevant text, rather than simple frequencies of indicative terms or phrases. Furthermore, future 
work should improve upon the measures of institutional similarity generated here, especially in 
terms of validation against existing measures of institutional characteristics like CBI scores. 
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Finally, future work should test the applicability of this model to political economic decisions in 
different cultures and times, as well as under varying degrees of risk and uncertainty, to gauge its 
generalizability more broadly.   
Social similarity is a consequential factor in economically distributive decisions made 
under great uncertainty. Cognitive foundations of these heuristics have been demonstrated in a 
battery of social psychological experiments and studies, and this paper demonstrates that 
financial policy elites are not above the human tendencies which these heuristics embody. 
Rather, it appears that members of the FOMC chose institutions which most resemble their own 
to receive billions of dollars in what were effectively international bailouts between central 
banks. The recognition of the truly social nature of even elite decisions has consequences both 
for how we manage our existing international economic order, especially during global crises 
like that of 2008, as well as for the construction of a more equitably distributive system as we 
deepen our mutual international interdependence.  
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APPENDIX I 
BROZ REGRESSION MODEL WITH CENTRAL BANK  
INDEPENDENCE AND GLOBAL FINANCIAL CENTER 
Broz Model Regression Results with and without CBI 
 Dependent variable: 
  
 Currency Swap 
 Broz Model CBI & GFC 
 
US Bank Exposure 0.004* 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
   
Share Global GDP -0.736 -0.287 
 (1.791) (1.894) 
   
Share Global Liquid Liabilities 1.749 0.923 
 (2.880) (4.084) 
   
’07 Share US Trade 3.816 2.874 
 (2.241) (2.628) 
   
Inflation -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
   
Reserves IFS -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Dollar Shortage 0.003 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
   
Global Financial Center  0.303 
  (0.373) 
   
’07 Weighted CBI  -0.457 
  (0.392) 
   
Constant 0.259** 0.549* 
 (0.103) (0.300) 
    
Observations 33 32 
Max. Likelihood Pseudo-R2 0.263 0.349 
Log Likelihood -13.877 -12.053 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 43.754 44.105 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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APPENDIX II 
CENTRAL BANK SURVEY QUESTIONS 
a. What body/agency supervises banks? 
i. (a) The Central Bank 
ii. (b) A Single Bank Supervisory Agency/ Superintendency 
iii. (c) Multiple Bank Supervisory Agencies/Superintendencies 
b.  Is there a single financial supervisory agency for all of the main financial 
institutions (insurance companies, contractual savings institutions, savings 
banks)?   
c. Is there a single financial supervisory agency for all of the activities in which 
commercial banks are allowed to do business? 
d. To whom are the supervisory bodies responsible or accountable?  
i. (a) the Prime Minister 
ii. (b) the Finance Minister or other cabinet level official 
iii. (c) a legislative body, such as Parliament or Congress 
iv. (d) other 
e. How is the head of the supervisory agency (and other directors) appointed? 
i. (a) the decision of the head of government (e.g. President, Prime Minister)  
ii. (b) the decision of the Finance Minister or other cabinet level authority  
iii. (c) a simple majority of a legislative body (Parliament or Congress)  
iv. d) a supermajority (e.g, 60%, 75%) of a legislative body 
v. (e) other 
f. Can the head of the supervisory agency can be removed by:  
i. (a) the decision of the head of government (e.g. President, Prime 
Minister);  
ii. (b) the decision of the Finance Minister or other cabinet level authority;  
iii. (c) a simple majority of a legislative body (Parliament or Congress);  
iv. (d) a supermajority (e.g, 60%, 75%) of a legislative body;  
v. (e) other 
g. Does the head of the supervisory agency (and other directors) have a fixed term? 
h. Is your country planning on adopting Basel II? 
i. If an infraction of any prudential regulation is found in the course of supervision, 
must it be reported? 
j. Are there mandatory actions that the supervisor must take in these cases? 
k. Can individual supervisory staff be held personally liable for damages to a bank 
caused by their actions or omissions committed in the good faith exercise of their 
duties? 
l. Can the supervisory agency be held liable for damages to a bank caused by its 
actions? 
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APPENDIX III 
REGRESSION MODEL INCLUDING US BANK EXPOSURE AND TRADE 
 
 Dependent variable: Currency Swap 
 Full Model & Exposure 
US Bank Exposure 0.001 
 (0.001) 
US Trade Share -0.138 
 (1.998) 
5yr Max. Term Similarity -0.004* 
 (0.002) 
5yr Max. S.W. Similarity 0.490** 
 (0.218) 
Factor Cosine Similarity -0.136 
 (0.248) 
Factor Index Sum -0.024 
 (0.031) 
5yr Max. Log Weighted Proximity 0.463** 
 (0.207) 
’07 CBI Weighted Diff. 0.662** 
 (0.279) 
Log GDP 0.043 
 (0.036) 
Constant -1.095 
 (0.832) 
Observations 35 
Max. Likelihood Pseudo-R2 0.815 
Log Likelihood -2.866 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 25.731 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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APPENDIX IV 
REGRESSION MODELS DEMONSTRATING SOCIAL SIMILARITY 
EFFECT ON BANK EXPOSURE AND TRADE 
 Dependent variables:  
 US Bank Exposure US Trade Share ‘07 
 (1) (2) 
5yr Max. Term Similarity -0.012 -0.0002 
 (0.303) (0.0001) 
5yr Max. S.W. Similarity 24.755 0.044*** 
 (27.579) (0.014) 
Factor Cosine Similarity  -5.856 -0.010 
 (30.322) (0.014) 
Factor Index Sum -2.369 -0.001 
 (4.232) (0.002) 
5yr Max. Log Weighted Proximity 47.779** 0.020** 
 (18.971) (0.009) 
’07 CBI Weighted Diff. 55.134 0.034** 
 (33.078) (0.015) 
Constant -12.083 -0.012 
 (20.924) (0.009) 
Observations 55 59 
R2 0.202 0.318 
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.240 
Residual Std. Error 46.535 (df = 48) 0.023 (df = 52) 
F Statistic 2.031* (df = 6; 48) 4.049*** (df = 6; 52) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
41 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
"2008 Public Budget Database". Fiscal Year 2008 Public Budget Database. United States Office 
  of Management and Budget. Receipts: Public Budget Database. Retrieved 14 March 
  2015. 
Aizenman, Joshua, and Gurnain K. Pasricha. Selective Swap Arrangements and the Global 
  Financial Crisis: Analysis and Interpretation. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of  
 Economic Research, 2009. Internet resource. 
Amaya, Diego, and Jean-Yves Filbien. "The Similarity of Ecb’s Communication." Finance 
 Research Letters. 13.1 (2015): 234-242. Print. 
Baker, Andrew. 2010. “Restraining Regulatory Capture? Anglo America, Crisis Politics and 
  Trajectories of Change in Global Financial Governance”, International Affairs 86(3): 
 647-664. 
Barth, James R, Gerard Caprio, and Ross Levine. "Banking Systems Around the Globe: Do 
 Regulation and Ownership Affect Performance and Stability?" Prudential Supervision : 
  What Works and What Doesn't / Edited by Frederic S. Mishkin. (2001). Print. 
Broz, J.Lawrence. "The Politics of Rescuing the World's Financial System: the Federal Reserve 
 As a Global Lender of Last Resort." The Korean Journal of International Studies. 13.2 
  (2015): 323. Print. 
Canelli, Maria. “Re: Questions About Central Bank Speeches.” Message to Timothy Marple. 8 
 August 2016. E-mail. 
42 
Cihak, Martin; Demirguc-Kunt, Asli; Peria, Maria Soledad Martinez; Mohseni-Cheraghlou, 
  Amin. 2012. Bank regulation and supervision around the world : a crisis update. Policy 
 Research working paper ; no. WPS 6286. Washington, DC: World Bank.  
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/279091468168248726/Bank-regulation-and-
supervision-around-the-world-a-crisis-update 
Davies, H, and David Green. Banking on the Future: The Fall and Rise of Central Banking. 
 Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print. 
Dittmar, Robert, William T. Gavin, and Finn E. Kydland. Price-level Uncertainty and Inflation 
 Targeting. Ann Arbor, Mich: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social  
  Research [distributor, 1999. Internet resource. 
Drezner, Daniel W. "The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great 
 Recession." World Politics 66.01 (2013): 123-64. Web. 
Dunning, David, and Geoffrey L. Cohen. "Egocentric definitions of traits and abilities in social 
 judgment." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 63.3 (1992): 341. 
Dunning, David, and Andrew F. Hayes. "Evidence for egocentric comparison in social 
 judgment." Journal of personality and social psychology 71.2 (1996): 213. 
Ehrmann, Michael, and Marcel Fratzscher. The Timing of Central Bank Communication. 
 Frankfurt am Main: European Central Bank, 2005. Internet resource. 
Ehrmann, Michael, and Marcel Fratzsche. "Communication by Central Bank Committee 
 Members: Different Strategies, Same Effectiveness?" Journal of Money, Credit and 
 Banking. 39 (2007): 509-541. Print. 
43 
"Enforcement Actions." FRB: 2016 Enforcement Actions. N.p., n.d. Web. 30 Nov. 2016. 
Engelen, Ewald, et al. "Misrule of experts? The financial crisis as elite debacle." Economy and 
 Society 41.3 (2012): 360-382. 
Garriga, Ana Carolina.  2016.  Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Dataset. 
 International Interactions 42 (5):849-868  doi: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1188813 
Grant, W. 1993. Business and Politics in Britain (London: Macmillan) 
Gumperz, John J, and Stephen C. Levinson. Rethinking Linguistic Relativity. Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press, 1996. Print. 
Ho, D.E, K Imai, G King, and E.A Stuart. "Matchit: Nonparametric Preprocessing for Parametric 
 Causal Inference." Journal of Statistical Software. 42.8 (2011): 1-28. Print. 
Hüning, Hendrik. Asset market response to monetary policy news from SNB press releases. No. 
 177. HWWI Research Paper, 2016. 
Johnson, Simon, and Kwak, James. 2010. 13 Bankers. New York: Pantheon Books. 
Johnson, Simon. 2009. “The Quiet Coup”, Atlantic, May. 
Klein, Aaron. "The Fed's Striking Lack of Diversity and Why It Matters | Brookings Institution." 
 Brookings. Brookings, 02 Aug. 2016. Web. 24 Mar. 2017. 
Krueger, Joachim, and Russell W. Clement. "The truly false consensus effect: an ineradicable 
  and egocentric bias in social perception." Journal of personality and social psychology 
 67.4 (1994): 596. 
44 
Linder, Fridolin, et al. "Text as Policy: Measuring Policy Similarity Through Bill Text Reuse." 
 (2016). 
McDowell, D. "The Us As 'sovereign International Last-Resort Lender': the Fed's Currency 
 Swap Programme During the Great Panic of 2007-09." New Political Economy. 17.2 
 (2012): 157-178. Print. 
"Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee October 28-29, 2008." FOMC: Transcripts and 
 Other Historical Materials, 2008. Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve System, 
 29 Oct. 2008. Web. 
Mullen, Lincoln (2015). textreuse: Detect Text Reuse and Document Similarity. R package  
Porter, Tony, and Russell Williams. States, markets and regimes in global finance. Springer, 
 2016. 
Ross, Michael, and Fiore Sicoly. "Egocentric biases in availability and attribution." Journal of 
 personality and social psychology 37.3 (1979): 322-336.  
Seabrooke, Leonard and Tsingou, Eleni. 2009. “Power Elites and Everyday Politics in 
 International Financial Reform”, International Political Sociology, Vol. 3, Issue 4, pp. 
 457-461. 
Selmier, W. Travis. 2013. “Stand by Me: Friends, Relationship Banking, and Financial 
 Governance in Asia”, Business Horizons 56: 733-741 
Tett, Gillian. Fool's Gold: How the Bold Dream of a Small Tribe at J.p. Morgan Was Corrupted 
 by Wall Street Greed and Unleashed a Catastrophe. New York: Free Press, 2009. Print. 
45 
Tsingou, Eleni. 2008. “Transnational Private Governance and the Basel Process: Banking 
 Regulation and Supervision, Private Interests and Basel II”, in Noelke, Andreas and Graz, 
Jean-Christophe (Eds), Transnational Private Governance and Its Limits (London: Routledge and 
 ECPR), pp. 58-68. 
Tsingou, Eleni. 2014. “The Club Rules in Global Financial Governance”, The Political 
 Quarterly, 85(4): 417-419. 
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. "Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases." 
 Utility, probability, and human decision making. Springer Netherlands, 1975. 141-162. 
van Buuren, Stef, and Karin Groothuis-Oudshoorn (2011). mice: Multivariate Imputation by 
 Chained Equations in R. Journal of Statistical Software, 45(3), 1-67.  
Young,  Kevin.  2012. “Transnational  Regulatory  Capture?  An  Empirical  Examination  of 
 Transnational  Lobbying  of  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision”, Review 
  of International Political Economy, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 663-688. 
Young, Kevin and Pagliari, Stefano. 2015. “Capital United? Business Unity in Regulatory 
  Politics and the Special Place of Finance”, Regulation and Governance, forthcoming doi: 
 10.1111/rego.12098 
Young, Kevin, Tim Marple, and James Heilman. “Between Jobs: Advocacy Behavior and Social 
 Distance to Financial Regulators.” Forthcoming.  
